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The EU’s Promotion of Arctic Resources
Does the EU Meet its Policy
Objective of ‘‘Promoting
Sustainable Use of Arctic
Resources’’? An Analysis from
the Viewpoint of Arctic Energy
Resources
Antje Neumann* and Kamrul Hossain*
The EU started to develop its own Arctic policy in
2008. One of the three main objectives of this policy is
the promotion of sustainable use of Arctic resources.
‘‘Sustainability’’ was also a focus of the 2011
resolution of the European Parliament as a guiding
principle in developing European policies toward the
Arctic. Against this background, this article
investigates the question of whether the EU meets its
respective objective – sustainability – in regard to the
development of Arctic hydrocarbon resources. The
article contrasts the development of the EU’s overall
policy toward Arctic mineral resources with specific
EU measures and examines the EU’s capacity to
influence sustainable Arctic hydrocarbon resource
development. The article also elaborates on specific
questions related to the EU’s energy policy and the
development of Arctic hydrocarbon resources in recent
years as well as on the EU’s dependency on oil and gas
imports and respective tendencies to conclude on the
aforementioned questions.
I. Introduction
The European Union’s (EU’s) policy toward the Arctic
is aimed at three major objectives: protection and
preservation of the Arctic in unison with its population,
sustainable utilization of its resources, and multi-lateral
engagement in Arctic governance. Although not directly
geographically linked to the Arctic Ocean, the EU has
strong political and economic ties throughout the
membership and other agreements’ association to a
number of Arctic states. Especially in terms of its energy
demand, the Arctic plays an increasingly important role
in the EU. According to prognoses by the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) of 2008, the region holds
around one quarter of the world’s undiscovered
hydrocarbon resources. Presently, Russia and Norway
already supply substantial amounts of the EU’s primary
energy consumptions. Since the overall demand is
expected to further increase, and security conflicts in
the oil-rich Middle East are expected to prevail, a stable
supply is an increasingly important factor for the
European energy market. Against this background,
Arctic energy resources are also of strategic significance
for the EU.
In addition to the Arctic issues mentioned above,
combating climate change is another important policy
issue for the EU. Internally, its agenda is set on the 20-
20-20 goals – comprising the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions and the improvement in energy efficiency
and share for renewables to respective rates – while,
externally, the EU has played a key role in international
negotiations on climate change since the subject
appeared on the political agenda. At the same time,
climate change is one of the most pressing topics in the
Artic. The temperature increase has been recorded two
to three times higher there than in the rest of the world,
which results in rapid melting of sea ice. And although
these developments possibly allow for easier access and
passage opportunities in the future, resource activities
bear a heightened risk for the fragile environment with
its highly sensitive ecosystems. Oil exploration and
exploitation, especially, pose severe threats, with the
possibility of accidents that can result in oil spills and
other serious consequences.
The EU, which began to develop its own Arctic
policy in 2008, has signalled that it has a clear interest
in both – tapping the region’s natural resources while
protecting the Arctic environment. With the European
Parliament’s resolution entitled ‘‘A sustainable EU
policy for the High North,’’ released in January 2011,
the focus has been on sustainability, which should
apply as a guiding principle in developing European
policies toward the Arctic. This paper focuses on the
EU’s approach to sustainability and environmental
protection, as one of the constituent parts of sustain-
able development, in using Arctic natural resources.1
The paper will not assess sustainability measures and
environmental protection efforts of the EU as such,
except for those that are connected with the explora-
tion and exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources.
In this framework, the paper deals with the central
question of whether the EU’s efforts meet its
respective policy objective that resource exploitation
in the Arctic is carried out in a sustainable way and in
full respect of strict environmental standards, taking
into account the particular vulnerability of this region.
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Before dealing with this question in more detail, the
article provides a general discussion of the EU’s
energy policy, with an emphasis on the interrelation-
ship between energy policy and climate change
mitigation targets. Section three gives an overview of
the development of Arctic hydrocarbon resources in
recent years. In section four, the EU’s dependency on
oil and gas imports and respective tendencies are
explored. Section five addresses EU’s environmental
responsibility while investigating Arctic mineral
resource activities. In this context, an introduction of
the legal basis of European policies toward the Arctic,
with an emphasis on sustainability and resource
policy, is followed by contrasting the development of
the EU’s general policy toward Arctic mineral
resources with specific EU measures. Finally, the
article concludes with an overall assessment of the
EU’s efforts toward sustainability in regard to Arctic
energy resource development by pointing out the
achieved progress as well as the remaining deficiencies.
II. EU Energy Policy – a Brief Overview
Sustainability is one of the three pillars of the overall
EU energy policy. The EU relies heavily on the
Arctic’s hydrocarbon resources, in particular on that
of Russia and Norway, as is shown elsewhere in this
article. Sustainable Arctic hydrocarbon developments
thus necessarily have an effect on the EU in terms of
its commitment to the promotion of sustainable
resources practices both within the EU and beyond.
A brief account of EU’s energy policy is worth
mentioning here to show how external resource
extraction may impact EU policy objectives as a
whole, where in addition to sustainability, an inte-
grated aspect of competitiveness and security of
supplies – the other two pillars – constitute the EU’s
energy policy. Even though the EU so far does not
have any single document encompassing all aspects of
energy components, the Lisbon Treaty2 has provided a
relatively stronger legal basis for a more coherent
energy policy. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly lists energy
as a ‘‘shared competence between the Union and its
Member States’’ and introduces the ‘‘energy chapter,’’
recognising the powers of the EU to develop a
harmonised energy policy applicable to all members.
The idea behind introducing the energy chapter is to
develop more strategic policy goals and to harmonize
the fragmented energy policy for the EU as a whole.
By virtue of Article 194 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the
EU energy policy should not only meet the goals of
sustainability, competitiveness, and security of sup-
plies, but it should also integrate preservation and the
improvement of the environment.3 As a result, the
legal basis for an energy policy under Article 194 is not
only to integrate environmental considerations but
also to adopt a proactive and effective role to preserve
and promote the environment.4
The liberalization of the European energy market
with an EU-wide emphasis on energy savings and the
development of renewable resources has aimed at
meeting the EU’s goal of climate change mitigation at
the European policy level.5 However, the biggest
challenge for the EU is to establish an inter-linkage
between energy efficiency and its climate change
ambition. Here lies the paradoxical premise: while the
EU’s demand for the import of fossil fuel is gradually
on the increase, the EU has made an ambitious
emission reduction commitment to itself by introducing
a policy to promote emission reduction goals beyond
the EU.6 However, consumption of fossil fuels and
reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions cannot
go hand in hand, the context which has gained
momentum since 2007, with the EU’s renewed commit-
ment to the reduction of GHG emissions from all
energy intensive projects.7 The EU’s 1997 Kyoto
Protocol commitment to reduce 8% of GHG emissions
2 See Treaty of Lisbon Tackling European in the 21st
Century (Jun 09 2010), available at http://europa.eu/
lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm. (The Treaty of Lisbon
entered into force on 1 December 2009. The Treaty
amended the current EU and EC Treaties without replacing
them. The Treaty provides the EU with the legal framework
and tools necessary to meet future challenges and to respond
to its citizens’ demands. With a view to creating a more
efficient Europe, the Treaty emphasized the improvement
upon the lives of Europeans by acting in policy areas, such
as in the energy sector.).
3 See Foundation Robert Schuman, The Lisbon Treaty 10
Easy to Read Fact Sheet (Jun. 22, 2010), available at http://
www.robert-schuman.eu/en/dossiers-pedagogiques/traite
lisbonne/10fiches.pdf.http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/
divers/lisbonne/en/10fiches.pdf.
4 Article 11 of the TFEU sets out the obligation concerning
incorporation of environmental consideration in the making
of energy policy; whereas article 194 went a step further
requiring measures to preserve and improve the environ-
ment.
5 European Commission Communication COM/2011/0885
final of 15 December 2011 on ‘‘Energy Roadmap 2050’’.
6 Kamrul Hossain, ‘‘Looking at the Arctic? The EU Energy
Policy, Dependence and Environmental Responsibility
toward Arctic Hydrocarbons’’, 2 UPES Law Review
(2014) (forthcoming).
7 See Danielle Devogelaer & Dominique Gusbin, EU
Energy/Climate Package and Energy Supply & Security,
Belgium Jun. 16, 2010, available at http://www.plan.be/
admin/uploaded/201001051126560.wp200916.pdf. (The EU
agreed to reduce its greenhouse gas emission by 20% by
2020 compared with its 1990 levels and an objective for a
30% reduction by 2020 subject to the conclusion of a
comprehensive international climate change agreement; a
mandatory 20% share of renewables in gross final energy
demand by 2020 for the EU as a whole including 10% share
of renewables in transport for each Member State; and an
improvement of energy efficiency by 20% compared with
baseline levels by 2020.
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by 2012 included energy as one of the six identified
industry sectors, from which it aimed to limit
emissions of carbon dioxide.8 Before the new members
were admitted in 2004, the 15 EU countries (EU-15)
were well on track to meet this target.9 The majority of
the new members that have joined since 2004 have set
a target between 6% and 8%, with the exception of
Croatia, which has set a target of 5% and is on course
to achieve this goal.10 In several of its policy
documents beginning in 2006, the EU has agreed to
increase emission reduction commitments, energy
savings potential, as well as the production of renew-
able energy by adopting various measures and action
plans. The overall goal of the EU has been to achieve
the so-called 20-20-20 goals – a 20% reduction in
GHG compared to the 1990 level, a 20% increase in
renewables, and a 20% increase in energy efficiency
(savings) by 2020.
To achieve the aforementioned goals, the EU
adopted a series of policy documents, which include
a 2006 Green Paper;11 a 2007 document on energy
policy for Europe;12 the EU Commission’s commu-
nication entitled ‘‘Towards a European Strategic
Energy Technology Plan’’ (SET Plan) of 2007;13 the
integrated maritime policy of 2007,14 having an energy
component as a separate document, entitled ‘‘Energy
Policy and Maritime Policy: Ensuring a Better Fit’’;15
the Commission’s ‘‘Second Strategic Energy Review’’
of November 2008;16 the ‘‘Climate and Energy
Package’’ of the EU Parliament and the Council of
2008;17 and the Commission’s communication on
options to go beyond 20% GHG reduction of
2010.18 In 2010, the Commission adopted a commu-
nication on energy strategy entitled ‘‘Energy 2020,’’19
setting the basis for EU’s existing energy policy. The
strategy incorporated smart, sustainable, and inclusive
growth in the energy sector, upholding the EU’s
climate goals, which, among the others, focused on
strengthening external dimensions of the EU energy
market. The Energy Roadmap 2050 was adopted in
2011 to set climate policy goals, offering an analysis of
the long-term energy policy orientations with a view to
achieving a low carbon economy. In March 2013,
based on the energy 2020 strategy as well as on
Roadmap 2050, the EU Commission adopted yet
another Green Paper entitled ‘‘A 2030 Framework for
Climate and Energy Policies,’’20 followed by a policy
framework in January 2014 entitled ‘‘A Policy Frame-
work for Climate and Energy in the Period from 2020
to 2030.’’21 The EU leaders agreed in March 2014 to
decide on the framework in October 2014. The ‘‘Policy
Framework’’ reflects a number of important issues
including binding GHG reduction targets, binding
renewable energy targets, energy efficiency, reform of
the EU emission trading system (ETS), affordability
and energy security, and new governance systems in
the energy sector, adopting a common approach in
national plans for energy security and sustainability.22
These documents present EU’s visions, its strategy
8 See James Gubb, EU Environmental Policy (Jun. 11, 2010),
available at http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/download/
ENV.1.Environment%20Policy.pdf. (Other industry sectors
are: steel, cement, glass, brick-making, and paper/cardboard
production. The 2008 EU Climate Change package added
aircraft emissions to the ETS (from 2012), and reasserted the
EU’s commitment to reduce CO2 emissions through Carbon
Capture and Storage. Then again in 2008, the EU reasserted
a commitment to reduce CO2 from new cars by 2010, and to
fine manufacturers for each gram of CO2 they produce over
the target (C=20 in 2012, C=95 in 2015).
9 See European Commission, What is the EU doing about
climate change? (Dec. 2013), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/.
10 Id.
11 The Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable,
Competitive and Secure Energy, available at http://europa.
eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf
12 See Council of the European Union, ‘‘An Energy Policy
for Europe’ (Jun. 11, 2010), available at http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true
&sc=false&f=ST%205282%202007%20INIT&r=http
%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2-
Fen%2F07%2Fst05%2Fst05282.en07.pdf.
13 See Council of the European Union, Towards a European
Strategic Energy Technology Plan, (Jun. 22, 2010), available
at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t
=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%205240%202007%
20INIT&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.
eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F07%2Fst05%2Fst05240.en07.pdf.
14 See Council of the European Union, An Integrated
Maritime Policy for the European Union, (Jun. 21, 2010),
available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=
EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2014631%
202007%20INIT&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.
europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F07%2Fst14%2Fst14631.
en07.pdf.
15 European Commission Staff Working Document SEC
(2007) 1283 of 10 October 2010 on ‘‘Energy Policy and
Maritime Policy: Ensuring a Better Fit’’.
16 European Commission Communication COM/2008/0781
of 13 November 2008 on ‘‘Second Strategic Energy Review -
An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan’’.
17 Council of the European Union 17215/08 of 12 December
2008 on ‘‘Energy and climate package - elements of the final
compromise agreed by the European Council’’.
18 European Commission Communication COM/2010/0265
final of 26 May 2010 on ‘‘Analysis of options to move
beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and
assessing the risk of carbon leakage’’.
19 European Commission Communication COM/2010/639
final of 10 November 2010 on ‘‘Energy 2020 - A strategy for
competitive, sustainable and secure energy’’.
20 European Commission Green Paper COM/2013/0169
final of 27 March 2013 on ‘‘A 2030 framework for climate
and energy policies’’.
21 European Commission Communication COM/2014/015
final of 22 January 2014 on ‘‘A policy framework for climate
and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030’’.
22 See European Commission Press Release IP/14/54 of 22
January 2014 on ‘‘2030 climate and energy goals for a
competitive, secure and low-carbon EU economy’’, available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-54_en.htm.
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and policy for moving forward to achieve its set goals,
as well as its renewed commitments for further
progress for an integrated EU energy policy with a
view to achieving clean, efficient, and low-carbon
energy. Concerning its ambitious goal of reduction of
GHG emissions, the EU’s renewed commitment
suggests yet another increase in emission reduction: a
40% cut from the 1990 level by 2030 (which means
going beyond the EU’s earlier commitment of a 20%
reduction by 2020). If this plan goes accordingly, the
EU is expected to be on track to fulfil its emissions
reduction of 80% by 2050. In addition, the policy
framework also suggests emissions reductions from
the sectors covered by the EU ETS by 43% as
compared to the 2005 level, while the target for
emission reductions from outside the EU ETS is
planned to be 30% below the 2005 level.23
The EU policy documents constantly emphasized
the diversification of energy supply by introducing
more carbon-free energy technology.24 The develop-
ment of wind power, solar power (thermal, photo-
voltaic, and concentrated), hydropower, tidal power,
geothermal energy, and second generation biomass
has been routinely encouraged and assessed. This new
generation of energy sources is expected to enable the
EU not only to meet its increased energy demands but
also to contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions
of between 60 and 70% by 2050, which eventually will
be a step toward fulfilling the goals set by the
‘‘Roadmap 2050,’’ that is, de-carbonization with
80%–95% emission cuts, compared to the 1990
levels.25 The recent policy document also proposes an
increase of 27% in the production of renewables by
2030 in EU’s energy mix.26 This increase furthermore
motivates improvement in the EU’s energy trade
balance to achieve security of supply.27 The policy
documents also highlighted cross-sectorial aspects of
energy components with various other policy areas,
such as with maritime policy. Improvement of energy
efficiency has also been argued from a standpoint of
multiple energy usages, with particular emphasis on
buildings and energy-intensive products. Solidarity
among the EU member states has also been acknowl-
edged to enhance energy efficiency and savings. The
renewed target for energy efficiency is expected to be
considered in the Energy Efficiency Directive, which
will be concluded sometime in June 2014.
Despite the ambiguous policy objectives mentioned
above, critical voices suggest that the EU energy
policy, which has achieved a rather relatively stronger
legal basis under the Lisbon Treaty; to a large extent,
however, Treaty rules remains business as usual.28 This
is mainly due to member states’ national competence
over the energy mix, energy foreign policy, and the
conditions for exploiting EU’s energy resources
individually.29 This individual competence offers an
obstacle in developing a common EU voice on energy
issues.
The member states are nevertheless subject to
general obligations of sincere cooperation and compe-
tition, rules that apply to the import and transit of
energy.30 The Lisbon Treaty formalizes the shared
ownership of the EU energy policy between the EU
institutions and its member states.31 As the Treaty
offers room to coordinate the ‘‘shared competence’’ of
EU institutions and members, consensus can be
achieved on the targeted goals followed by actions in
the respective areas of energy practices within the
EU.32 The Treaty also offers new means of external
representation to further the Union’s cooperation and
dialogue with non-EU countries and regions, since the
Union is looking at energy matters beyond the internal
market. The Single Market Act II of 2012 is of
importance here; it identified energy as one of the four
drivers of growth. The Act aimed at improving the
implementation and enforcement of internal market
legislation, which proposed priority actions to make
the application of the existing EU energy legislation
more effective and make cross-border energy markets
a reality, for which there is no alternative but to have a
single set of energy policy for the EU as a whole,
providing for its internal and external dimensions.
While the EU maintains close links to the Arctic,
especially through political partnerships and economic
cooperation, the Arctic nevertheless still primarily falls
outside of its jurisdiction, in particular concerning the
questions of offshore hydrocarbon practices or the
energy supply from Arctic states other than its own.
Thus, from a legal perspective, the Arctic as a region is
particularly relevant to the EU’s external policy areas.
This relevance has been reflected in the EU’s ‘‘Energy
2020 Strategy,’’ mentioned above. Its fifth objective –
strengthening the external dimension of the EU energy
market – is of major relevance for the Arctic. The
strategy calls for more effective coordination at the
EU and member state level as well as for more
consistency and mutual reinforcement of the external
dimensions of the EU’s energy policy with other
23 Supra, note 22.
24 European Commission Communication COM (2007) 723
final of 22 November 2007 on ‘‘A European strategic energy
technology plan (SET Plan) – Towards a low carbon
future’’.
25 Supra, note 6.
26 See supra, note 22.
27 Ibid.
28 Susanne Langsdorf, ‘‘Energy Roadmap 2050 – A history
of EU energy policy, Green European Foundation’’ (2011)
at 8 available at http://gef.eu/uploads/media/History_of
_EU_energy_policy.pdf.
29 Ibid. at 6.
30 Jan Frederik Braun, ‘‘EU Energy Policy under the Treaty
of Lisbon Rules between a new policy and business as
usual’’, Working Paper No. 31 (2011), European Policy
Institute Network (EPIN), at 2.
31 Susanne Langsdorf, supra, note 29 at 6.
32 Ibid. at 9.
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external activities of the EU, like that of development,
trade, climate and biodiversity, enlargement, Common
Foreign and Security Policy, and so forth. Thus, four
actions are proposed, whereby Action 2 – the
establishment of so-called privileged partnerships with
key partners in supply and transit – becomes especially
relevant in view of the Arctic region, with Russia and
Norway as leading suppliers of crude oil and gas to the
EU-27-market. A subsequent communication on
international cooperation with external energy suppli-
ers released in September 201133 takes up the
emphasized objective. It proposes the following four
priorities:
1. Building up the external dimension of our
internal energy market;
2. Strengthening partnerships for secure, safe,
sustainable and competitive energy;
3. Improving access to sustainable energy for
developing countries; and
4. Better promoting EU policies beyond its borders.
Subsequent to this communication, in October 2012,
the European Parliament and the Council adopted a
‘‘Decision on establishing an information exchange
mechanism on intergovernmental agreements between
Member States and third countries in the field of
energy.’’34 This decision – with the objective to
increase transparency among the member states and
ensure that EU internal market rules and energy
security policy goals are respected in such agreements
– came into force in November 2012.
III. Development of Arctic Hydrocarbon
Resources
The Arctic is considered to be a ‘‘new frontier’’ for oil
and gas reserves.35 The region has attracted tremen-
dous attention for its huge potential for hydrocarbon
resources and its possible development, and this has
become an emerging area of focus. The Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment (ACIA) Report estimated that
there are significant oil and gas reserves in the Arctic
marine area and that most of these are located within
the jurisdiction of Russia, with additional fields in
Canada, Alaska (United States), Greenland (Den-
mark), and Norway.36 The USGS found further
evidence to this effect, first in 2008 and then again in
2010. The survey suggested that the area north of the
Arctic Circle holds approximately 30% of the world’s
undiscovered gas and 13% of its undiscovered oil and
that most of these resources are present in less than
500 meters below sea level.37 It has been further
estimated that approximately 84% of the undiscovered
oil and gas is located in the offshore Arctic,
representing around 90 billion barrels of technically
recoverable oil.38 Although the Eurasian side of the
Arctic has greater reserves of natural gas, the North
American side is more oil-rich; it is estimated to
contain approximately 65% of undiscovered Arctic oil
but only 26% of undiscovered Arctic natural gas.39 It
is presumed that the remainder of the resources is in
the European Arctic, and these are primarily believed
to be in the Russian Arctic. Interestingly, 97% of these
resources are thought to be within the exclusive
jurisdictions of the Arctic coastal states, in other
words, within 200 nautical miles of the continental
shelves, according to the USGS.40 These estimates,
however, are not yet confirmed with exact precision.
Extreme climatic conditions, the presence of a thick ice
sheet, and remoteness hinder appropriate assessments.
Moreover, within the Russian Arctic shelves, explora-
tion has so far been conducted rather poorly.
Consequently, we say that the amount of resources
currently believed to be available may have been either
over or underestimated. Notwithstanding this, the
likelihood of there being resource reserves in the Arctic
shelves cannot be ignored.
Nevertheless, the point is that none of these
resources has been previously tapped, due to harsh
climate conditions, inadequate technology, and the
presence of polar ice. Due to an estimated increase in
the demand of global oil41 and, more so, of natural
33 European Commission Communication COM/2011/539
final of 7 September 2011 on ‘‘On security of energy supply
and international cooperation – ‘The EU Energy Policy:
Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders’ ’’.
34 European Parliament & Council of the European Union
Decision No 994/2012/EU of 25 October 2012 on ‘‘Estab-
lishing an information exchange mechanism on intergovern-
mental agreements between Member States and third
countries in the field of energy’’.
35 See for example, http://www.theguardian.com/environment
/2011/jul/05/oil-supplies-arctic.
36 See ACIA, a Warning Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment (2004) 44, available at www.amap.no/documents/
download/1057? Also See Bruce C. Forbes and Florian
Stammler, ‘‘Arctic Climate Change Discourse: the Con-
trasting Politics of Research Agendas in the West and
Russia’’, Polar Research (2009), 28.
37 Gautier D. L. et al., ‘‘Assessment of Undiscovered Oil
and Gas in the Arctic’’, 324 Science (2009), 1275.
38 Bird, J. K. J.., et al ‘‘USGS: Circum-Arctic Resource
Appraisal: Estimates of undiscovered Oil and Gas North of
the Arctic Circle’’ (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/
2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf.
39 Nong Hong, ‘‘The energy factor in the Arctic dispute: A
pathway to conflict or cooperation?’’ 5 Journal of Energy Law
and Business (2012) available at http://www.nanhai.org.cn/
include_lc/upload/UploadFiles/201212112191553324.pdf.
(2012).
40 ‘‘Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011 –
2020’’, 14 (Aug. 2011) available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/policies/raw-materials/files/docs/mss-denmark_
en.pdf.
41 The International Energy Agency projects in a current
policy scenario as well as in a new policy scenario (with
more oil use efficiency and switching to other fuels) an
absolute global primary oil uses increase, even if the share of
oil in total primary energy demand is expected to decrease.
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gas,42 it is believed that the expansion of hydrocarbon
extraction in the Arctic is just a matter of time. In
recent years, both energy industries and the Arctic
states have found it to be of increasing interest to
exploit oil and gas in the region. Indeed, in many areas
within the circumpolar north, exploitation of oil and
gas is already a major economic driver.43 The
exploitation of these resources increasingly becomes
a reality as rapid sea ice melt results in greater
accessibility to the offshore Arctic. In addition, other
motivating factors, such as high oil prices in the world
market, advancement of ship design technology and
drilling equipment, and regional political stability of
the Arctic, contribute to the increasing pace of
regional hydrocarbon extraction.44 Thus, current
prognoses state that respective investments could
reach $100 billion or more over the next decade,
mostly in the mineral sector.45
However, Arctic offshore drilling is relatively more
expensive, and the high cost of doing business in the
area suggests that only the world’s largest oil and gas
companies will have the financial, technical, and
managerial strength to accomplish the costly and
time-consuming projects dictated by the Arctic condi-
tions.46 A short drilling season and possible effects on
the Arctic’s unique ecosystem also slacken the devel-
opment of new fields. The Arctic climate and weather
will apparently be less predictable as time goes by, as
will the ice conditions in the Arctic Ocean. Although
the long-term pattern is clear,47 year to year variations
in ice will be great, with some seasons being colder and
having more ice than has been ‘‘normal’’ in recent
years. Such conditions will have the effect of
significantly limiting the possibilities of moving oil
and gas operations farther out to sea, even if the ice
edge retreats. The industries cannot count on areas
that are ice free, and in the case of fixed installations,
they will have to prepare for a situation in which the
maximum extent of the ice does not differ much from
that of today, although the ice will be thinner on
average.48 The Arctic development is, therefore,
considered to be of greater risk from environmental
perspectives. There are four main stages of hydro-
carbon development: geological and geophysical
survey, exploration, development and production,
and decommissioning. Each of these stages also
involves various activities along with associated
environmental impacts,49 the possible consequence of
which is arguably greater if compared with other
areas. Any accidental oil spills or spills occurred
during the extraction process may have serious
environmental consequences in the Arctic region.
Moreover, from the perspective of oil and gas
companies, the Arctic hydrocarbon exercise is still in
its infancy, as costs for possible environmental
mitigation, such as clean-up operations, are expensive,
and the process is extremely difficult.
IV.EU-Import Rates and Tendencies
The EU is the world’s second largest economy. It
consumes one fifth of the world’s energy, with few
reserves of its own,50 and its energy demand is ever-
increasing. When counted together, the EU member
states are the world’s largest energy importer. The EU
is currently importing about 55% of its energy supply.
This comprises 84% oil and 64% natural gas.51
According to 2011 estimates, the EU’s primary energy
sources include 24% natural gas, 37% oil, 18% coal,
and 12% nuclear.52 A major share of its primary
cont.
IEA, World Energy Outlook 102 (2011) available at http://
www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
WEO2011_WEB.pdf.
42 For natural gas the IEA expects an increase in demand as
well as an increase in the share of the TPES in all scenarios.
Ibid at 180.
43 AMAP, Arctic Oil & Gas (2007), 1 and 17, available at
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-oil-and-gas-
2007/71.
44 This fear is because of the oil crisis the world faced in
October 1973, when the Arab members of the petroleum
producing countries announced a ban on oil shipment to the
countries supporting Israel in 1973 Arab-Israel war. See
‘‘US Energy Information Administration’’, 25th Anniver-
sary of the 1973 Oil Embargo, available at http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/25opec/anniversary.html.http://www.eia.
doe.gov/emeu/25opec/anniversary.html.
45 Chatham House (2012) ‘‘Arctic Opening: Opportunity
and Risk in the High North’’, p. 18. Available at http://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/
Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/
0412arctic.pdf.
46 Nong Hong, supra note 40, at 11-12.
47 A recent study by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Program (AMAP) suggests that the Arctic Ocean will be
seasonally ice-free during the summer within the next thirty
to forty years. See AMAP, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost
in the Arctic (SWIPA) (), available at http://amap.no/swipa/
SWIPA2011ExecutiveSummaryV2.pdf.
48 Svein Vigeland Rottem and Arild Moe, ‘‘Climate Change
in the North and the Role Industry input to Strategic
Impact Assessment Barents Region 2030’’ (2007), 15
available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0907.pdf.
49 Kristin Noelle Casper, ‘‘Oil and Gas Development in the
Arctic: Softening of Ice Demands Hardening of Interna-
tional Law’’, Natural Reserve Journal, Vol. 49 (2009), 832
available at http://lawlibrary.unm.edu/nrj/49/3-4/825-
882.pdf.
50 European Commission, The European Union explained
Energy, Directorate-General for Communication Publica-
tions (2012), p. 3.
51 European Commission, Market Observatory for Energy,
Key Figures, June 2011 available at http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/observatory/eu_27_info/doc/key_figures.pdf.
52 Michael Ratner et al, ‘‘Europe’s Energy Security: Options
and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification’’,
Congressional Research Service (2013) at 5, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf.
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energy supply comes from the Arctic, in particular,
from Russia and Norway.53 It has been estimated that
the imports will grow by approximately 65–70% over
the next 20 years.54 Oil imports to the EU are from
Russia/CIS (38%), which has been constantly increas-
ing in the past few years, the Middle East (22%),
Norway (15%), North America (14%), and other
countries (11%), and clearly shows that a large share
of EU consumption is from the Arctic states (Russia,
Norway, and North America). According to recent
estimates about 30% of the EU’s total energy imports
come from Russia, which is about 70% of Russia’s
exports.55
The EU apparently relies constantly on the supply
of natural gas from Russia. This is also because use of
natural gas contributes relatively less to the emission
of GHG than other sources, such as coal. To reach its
ambitious targets to reduce carbon dioxide and
greenhouse gas emissions, the import of natural gas
has become a significant issue. It is expected that by
2030, the supply of natural gas in the EU’s energy
imports will increase to 30% from the present rate of
24%.56 The Commission’s forecast suggests an overall
import of 80% natural gas demands by 2030, and this
is, to a large extent, due to the fact that Germany
committed to shutting down its nuclear power plants
by 202257 and that some of the EU countries
committed to impose possible prohibitions on shale
gas development. As a result, there will be further
pressure on the imports of natural gas.58 Most of the
EU’s natural gas imports come from Norway and
Russia, which accounted for 35% and 34% of the
imports, respectively, in the year 2012. However,
Russian natural gas in the EU market is expected to
rise even further. Increasingly, Russian and European
companies have been developing an extensive infra-
structure to transport Russian gas to the European
market making EU-Russia relations significant in
terms of the natural gas supply.59 Some of the major
EU players, for example, Germany and Italy – the
largest importers of Russian gas – have negotiated
long-term deals with Russia.60 It has been thus said
that the energy resources of the Arctic could continue
to constitute a strategic reserve for Europe’s energy
demands, even though there have been some discus-
sions after the Ukrainian crisis that the EU will
probably reduce the Russian energy supply, and the
plan for alternative energy production from inside the
EU should be developed.61 In the UK, for example,
there is a major focus on the fracking of shale gas.
However, it will probably take time to develop, and
this is not an immediate option. Thus, the EU’s
dependence on the Russian supply will continue in the
near future. Many believe, therefore, that no matter
how successful the EU may be in identifying energy
supply alternatives, its dependence on Russian energy
is likely to continue.62
V. The EU’s Arctic Setting:
Investigating Arctic Energy
Resources vs. Sustainability
Against the above described background – the EU’s
dependency from energy imports to cover its growing
demand and the increasing importance of the Arctic
region in terms of mineral resource exploration and
exploitation – the EU, on the one hand, has expressed
its clear interests in tapping the region’s resources. On
the other hand, the EU is also keen to demonstrate
leadership in environmental standards for extracting
industries. In doing so, it has to face responsibility for
the highly vulnerable Arctic environment while
53 Since 2004, more than half of the EU-27’s gross inland
energy consumption was consumption supplied by net
imports. Much of the energy for EU consumption comes
from Russia. The EU is especially dependent on import of
hard coal, lignite and crude oil. In 2007, almost one third
(30.3 %) of the EU-27’s imports of crude oil were from
Russia; this was higher the rate than seven years earlier.
Russia also became the principal supplier of hard coal, its
share of EU-27 imports rising from 7.9 % in 2000 to 22.6 %
by 2007. Almost two thirds (63.6 %) of the EU imports of
natural gas in 2007 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria.
A similar analysis shows that 64.5 % of EU imports of hard
coal were from Russia, South Africa, Australia or Colom-
bia, while 59.5 % of crude oil imports came from Russia,
Norway, Libya or Saudi Arabia. The volume of imports
from other countries than Russian and Norway remain
relatively small. This was notably the case for crude oil
imports from Libya and Kazakhstan, coal imports from
Indonesia and Ukraine, or natural gas imports from Nigeria
and Libya. See European Commission Eurostat, Energy
Production and Imports (Aug. 2012) available at http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
Energy_production_and_imports.
54 Adele Airoldi, ‘‘The European Union and the Arctic
Policies and Actions’’, Nordic Council of Ministers (2008),
76.
55 More precisely, 88% of Russia’s total oil exports, 70% of
its gas exports and 50% of its coal exports. See ‘‘EU-Russia
Energy Relations’’ available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
international/bilateral_cooperation/russia/russia_en.htm.
56 Eurogas, ‘‘Long Term Outlook for Gas Demand and
Supply 2007-2030’’, June 5, 2010, p. 5, available at http://
www.eurogas.org/uploaded/Eurogas%20LT%20Outlook
%202007-2030_Final_251110.pdf.
57 The German Parliament adopted its decision for a nuclear
power phase-out until 2022 on 30 June 2011, available at
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13460039/
Bundestag-beschliesst-Atomausstieg-bis-2022.html.
58 See Michael Ratner et al, supra, note 53.
59 See ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 ‘‘Ukraine crisis sharpens focus on European shale gas’’,
March 14 (2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/03/14/europe-shale-ukraine-idUSL6N0MB1WI2014
0314.
62 See supra, note 53.
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investigating in the region’s mineral resources. Before
dealing with the question of responsibility in more
detail, the general relationship of the EU toward the
Arctic and the development of a respective policy in
terms of energy resources are illustrated in the
following.
5.1 The EU – an Arctic actor?
The Arctic is not a distinctive, uniquely defined region
– neither geographically nor economically nor legally.
The same applies to European-Arctic relations: Tak-
ing the eight Arctic states as a point of departure, three
of them are EU member states – Denmark (Green-
land), Finland, and Sweden. However, as Greenland
and the Faroe Islands do not belong to the EU, the
EU itself has no coastline to the Arctic marine area.
On the other hand, Iceland and Norway, as Arctic
states, belong to the European Economic Area (EEA)
and are therefore considerably impacted by EU law.
Furthermore, Russia is the main partner of the EU
within the Northern Dimension (ND) initiative, while
Canada and the United States are strategic partners of
the EU interlinked with each other by several bilateral
agreements.
Notwithstanding these links between the EU and
the eight Arctic states, EU law directly applies only to
three of them, and in the case of Denmark, this
application does not cover Greenland and the Faroe
Islands. Thus, foreign policy plays an important role.
The EU’s foreign policy is relatively new and still lacks
the supranational structure of other EU policy
domains (such as the single market, for instance).63
Along with this, the constitutional structure of EU
international relations law is fragmented.64 The Lisbon
Treaty, in effect since January 1, 2009 – although
having introduced new external policy institutions to
strengthen the EU’s foreign policy coordination and
consistency – has not principally changed this. More-
over, the main prerequisite to attain a common foreign
policy is still lacking. Except for the European
Parliament, the ‘‘project’’ of creating a common
foreign policy is rarely supported by European
institutions. This applies to the European Commis-
sion, which is concerned ‘‘that it might have to
sacrifice competences or prerogatives in the field of
external relations,’’ as well as to the Council, which
intends to maintain ‘‘its institutional set-up by first
creating a new Crisis Management and Planning
Directorate and then transferring it en bloc to the
External Service.’’65 A continued lack of political
initiative and strategic orientation keeps the EU from
securing its position in the world.66 This deficiency
also affects European efforts in formulating an Arctic
policy, in general, and in developing a sustainable
resource policy, in particular.
Two other factors that affect European Arctic
policy are as follows: (1) the relevance and status of
the principle of sustainable development within the
Treaties establishing the EU themselves, and (2) the
distribution of power and competences between the
EU and the member states. As far as sustainable
development as a guiding principle of the Treaty on
EU (TEU) is concerned, the current preamble to the
TEU maintains the reference to sustainable develop-
ment in more or less the same manner as the previous
TEU did. Moreover, Article 3 (3) of the TEU basically
reiterates the EU’s commitment to sustainable devel-
opment and a high level of protection and improve-
ment of the quality of the environment. Regarding its
relations to the wider world, the EU shall contribute,
among others, to ‘‘the sustainable development of the
Earth.’’ The latter objective is particularly important
in view of developing states and their role in achieving
sustainable development. The international agenda for
the EU includes another reference to sustainable
development in Title V, containing General Provisions
on the Union’s External Action. According to Article
21, this action shall ‘‘foster the sustainable economic,
social and environmental development of developing
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
[and] help develop international measures to preserve
and improve the quality of the environment and the
sustainable management of global natural resources,
in order to ensure sustainable development.’’ In this
context, the latter clause is particularly relevant to the
quality of the environment in Russia and respective
management measures, for example (without, how-
ever, categorizing Russia as a ‘‘developing country’’).
In relation to the distribution of power between the
EU and member states, the Treaty of Lisbon
introduced a catalogue of those competences that
were formerly distributed over the whole treaty
arrangement and have now become concentrated in
Articles 2–6 of the TFEU. While the vast majority of
policies comes under the heading of shared compe-
tences, where both the Union and the member states
share the power to legislate and adopt legally binding
acts, resource policy as such does not fall completely in
one type of competence or the other. It is rather
complex and affects almost all sectorial policies within
63 Michael E. Smith, ‘‘Toward a Theory of EU Foreign
Policy-Making. Multi-Level Governance, Domestic Politics,
and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign
and Security Policy’’, Journal of European Public Policy 11
(4) (2011), 740.
64 Paul P. Craig & Gra´inne De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases
and Materials, (4 ed., 2004) Oxford: University Press, 169.
65 Dieter Mahncke, ‘‘Post-modern Diplomacy: Can EU
Foreign Policy Make a Difference in World Politics?’’, EU
Diplomacy Papers 4 (2011), College of Europe, at 4, 5.
66 Annegret Bendiek & Ronja Kempin, ‘‘Europe’s Foreign
and Security Policy Adrift: Strengthening the Role of the EU-
3’’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
(SWP) Comments (2011), at 1, available at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011
C39_bdk_kmp_ks.pdf.
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the EU.67 Due to this complexity, difficulties in
defining boundaries between the competencies of the
EU and member states might arise in particular cases.
To sum up these legal aspects, it is important to
consider that when assessing European resource
policy, the policy area of access to and supply of
natural resources is not consistently regulated in the
EU’s regulation framework. This patchwork of
regulation makes European activities in the area of
resource policy difficult to handle and, in particular,
difficult to coordinate coherently. Additional difficul-
ties impede EU activities by the lack of a strong and
coherent foreign policy.
5.2 Development of the EU’s objective of promoting
sustainable use of Arctic resources
In the past, European interests in Arctic resources
were not regarded as significant enough to be
developed in a systematic and coordinated manner.
This has changed after summer 2007 when a Russian
flag on the seabed below the North Pole was planted
and when, due to climate change, increased accessi-
bility to the region’s resources started to be predicted.
In March 2008, the High Representative and the
European Commission issued a policy paper to the
European Council with the title Climate Change and
International Security.68 In this paper, European
interests toward Arctic trade and resources were
explicitly addressed, along with security and geo-
strategic dynamics.
In light of the then increasing ‘‘race’’ for Arctic
natural resources, especially for mineral resources such
as hydrocarbons, the European Parliament, in a
resolution on ‘‘Arctic Governance’’ in October 2008,
expressed its concerns about this competition and its
possible consequences for the EU’s security and
international stability.69 The Parliament called on the
Commission to address ‘‘options for a future cross-
border political or legal structure that could provide
for the environmental protection and sustainable
orderly development of the region or mediate political
disagreement over resources.’’70
Subsequently, the Commission issued its commu-
nication entitled The European Union and the Arctic
Region in November 200871 – the most far-reaching
and comprehensive EU strategic document on Arctic
policies to date. According to this communication, the
promotion of sustainable use of Arctic resources has
been set out as one of three main objectives. The
Commission’s communication went clearly beyond the
previous Parliament’s resolution by including natural
resource exploitation in the development of an EU
Arctic policy. It also addressed the EU’s interests in
securing an energy supply. Accordingly, the EU, under
this objective, should support the exploitation of
Arctic hydrocarbon resources while fully respecting
strict environmental standards. In this context, four
proposals for action were suggested, including the
strengthening of long-term cooperation (particularly
with Norway and the Russian Federation), the
pressing for the introduction of binding international
standards, and promoting further research and devel-
opment in offshore technology and infrastructures.
Special attention to the handling of Arctic mineral
resources was drawn in March 2009, when six groups
of Parliamentarians tabled a motion for a resolution on
an international treaty for the protection of the
Arctic.72 Therein, the respective members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) called explicitly on the
Commission and the Council ‘‘to work towards
establishing a moratorium on the exploitation of
geological resources in the Arctic for a period of 50
years [in analogy with the Antarctic Treaty and its
Environmental Protocol, Article 7] pending fresh
scientific studies.’’ Despite the fact that the necessary
majority for such a resolution was beyond reach, this
motion, and the following debate in the plenary
session, clearly indicated that opinions on the use of
Arctic mineral resources varied not only between the
European institutions themselves (Council, Commis-
sion, Parliament) but also between members of each of
these institutions, as in this case, the MEPs – reaching
from a comprehensive moratorium on mineral
resource exploitation to an open access to these
resources and support for their exploitation.
In its Conclusion on Arctic issues of December
200973 (Council of the European Union 2009), the
Council welcomed ‘‘the gradual formulation of a
policy on Arctic issues to address EU interests and
responsibilities, while recognizing Member States’
legitimate interests and rights in the Arctic.’’ These
conclusions also explicitly mention the region’s new
possibilities for natural resource extraction linked to
the melting sea ice and other climate change impacts.
Accordingly, an EU policy on Arctic issues should be
based not only on ‘‘sustainable’’ but also on ‘‘respon-
sible, [. . .] and cautious action.’’ To take a next step
toward the formulation of an overarching approach to
EU policy on Arctic issues, the Council recognized
67 For a more detailed picture on the EUs competencies
towards the Arctic, See Timo Koivurova et al., ‘‘The present
and future competence of the European Union in the
Arctic’’, Polar Record 48 (4) (2010) at 361 – 371.
68 European Commission & High Representative Paper
S113/08 of 14 March 2008 on ‘‘Climate Change and
International Security’’.
69 European Parliament Resolution P6_TA (2008)0474 of 9
October 2008 on ‘‘Arctic Governance’’.
70 Ibid, para 7 (d).
71 European Commission Communication COM/2008/0763
final of 20 November 2008 on ‘‘The European Union and
the Arctic Region’’.
72 European Parliament Joint Motion for a Resolution RC
B6 0163/2009 of 30 March 2009 on ‘‘The International
Treaty for the Protection of the Arctic’’.
73 Council of the European Union Conclusions of 8
December 2009 on ‘‘Arctic Issues’’.
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‘‘that EU policies on natural resource management
that impact on the Arctic should be formulated in
close dialogue with Arctic states and local commu-
nities and take into account the importance of
sustainable management of all natural resources in
that region.’’
In March 2010, a debate on Arctic issues was held in
the European Parliament, involving a statement of the
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy confirming the EU’s political and economic
interests in the Arctic. Regarding the usage of Arctic
natural resources, the representative concluded ‘‘that
Arctic resources should only be accessed and exploited
when we [the EU] have the highest environmental and
safety standards and when they are fully respected.’’74
Although the discussion at this occasion showed again
that opinions of MEPs still varied between represen-
tatives who called for a moratorium on the exploita-
tion of fossil resources75 and others who urged that the
Arctic be left to those countries who are directly
involved in the region, with the EU staying on the
side-lines,76 a majority of speakers from different
political groups stressed the need for better coordina-
tion and consistency of European efforts.
On January 20, 2011, a further step in defining
European interests toward the Arctic was made, when
the European Parliament adopted a ‘‘Resolution on a
sustainable EU policy for the High North.’’77 Despite
the fact that the title of the basic report and the finally
adopted resolution referred to the ‘‘High North’’ and
not the Arctic as such (as previous EU documents
did), a clear emphasis has been drawn on the region’s
natural resources. This became evident by highlighting
the region’s importance for securing the supply of
resources and energy needed for the population and
industries in Europe. In the followed plenary debate,
criticism was raised that a shift from environmental
protection to security of energy supply and natural
resource use has occurred in the Parliament’s attention
toward the region. Instead of focusing on a more
coherent approach to protect the Arctic environment
and balancing this objective with the sustainable use of
the region’s natural resources – all the more as
‘‘sustainability’’ has been stressed in the title itself of
the resolution – neither concrete measures nor effective
strategies were outlined by the report.78
With a one-year delay, a Commission’s progress
report – in the form of a communication issued by the
Commission and the High Representative and entitled
Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic
Region: progress since 2008 and next steps – was
released in June 2012. While reviewing and summariz-
ing the activities the EU has undertaken toward the
Arctic since 2008, part one of the communication sets
out further steps for the EU’s future engagement in the
Arctic. Regarding the declared goal of promoting
sustainable management and the use of Arctic
resources, the communication proposed to
– develop environmentally friendly, low-risk tech-
nologies that could be used by extractive
industries in view of increasing mining and oil
extraction activities, containing also a proposal
for a Regulation on the safety of offshore oil and
gas prospection, exploration and production
activities;
– strengthen partnership between EU and Green-
land that allows for an enhanced dialogue on
natural resources in order to share know-how
and experience; and
– to build stable and long-term partnerships with
major suppliers of energy and raw materials for
the EU-market such as Canada, Norway, the
Russian Federation, the US and other relevant
partners.79
The issue of oil and gas exploration reached a new
momentum when the European Parliament issued a
‘‘Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic’’ in
March 2014.80 In this resolution, the Parliament drew
‘‘attention to the fact that energy security is closely
related to climate change’’ and considered ‘‘that
energy security must be improved by reducing the
EU’s dependence on fossil fuels.’’81 In the same
context, it highlighted ‘‘the fact that the transforma-
tion of the Arctic represents one major effect of
climate change on EU security [and stressed] the need
to address this risk multiplier through a reinforced EU
strategy for the Arctic, and through an enhanced
policy of EU-generated renewable energies and energy
efficiency that significantly reduces the Union’s
reliance on external sources and thereby improves its
security position.’’82 Regarding oil and gas exploration
in the Arctic, the Parliament reiterated that serious
environmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters
require special attention to ensure environmental
protection of the Arctic and called on EU and EEA
74 European Parliament Debate of 10 March 2010 on ‘‘EU
policy on Arctic issues’’. The statements of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
of other Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), here
Satu Hassi & Anna Rosbach, are available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+CRE+20100310+ITEM-011+DOC+XML+V0//
EN.
75 Ibid, MEP Satu Hassi.
76 Ibid, MEP Anna Rosbach.
77 European Parliament Resolution P7_TA (2011)0024 of
20 January 2011 on ‘‘A sustainable EU policy for the High
North’’.
78 Ibid, explanations of votes.
79 European Commission & High Representative Joint
Communication JOIN (2012) 19 final of 26 June 2012 on
‘‘Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic
Region: progress since 2008 and next steps’’.
80 European Parliament Resolution RC-B7-0228/2014 of 12
March 2014 on ‘‘The EU Strategy for the Arctic’’.
81 Ibid, para 37.
82 Ibid.
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member states to assess the financial capacity of
applicants to cover all liabilities potentially deriving
from offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic.83
Differing from a respective motion for a resolution,
previously tabled on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group,84
the adopted resolution has not addressed the problem
of whether adequate clean-up opportunities for oil
spills in icy conditions exist,85 but it encouraged
investment in cold-climate expertise and relevant
environment-friendly technologies.86 In terms of envir-
onmental protection, the mentioned motion for a
resolution additionally called for the launch of an
international debate on environmental governance
and better environmental protection of the Arctic, as
well as for the establishment of a global sanctuary in
waters outside the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)
of the Arctic coastal states to be agreed on and
respected by both Arctic and non-Arctic countries.87
Last but not least, Parliament’s adopted resolution
appeared also more moderate in terms of environ-
mental concerns, raised by the Greens in regard to
intensified oil exploration and inadequate environ-
mental standards in waters around Greenland, and it
asked instead for opportunities to ‘‘contribute to and
assist in the sustainable development of Greenland so
that both environmental concerns and the need for
economic development are taken into account.’’88 In a
nutshell, Parliament’s recent resolution, although
emphasizing the serious environmental concerns
related to oil and gas exploration in the Arctic at
several occasions, follows, however, more or less the
same cadence as expressed in its resolution of January
2011, mentioned above, by focusing on sustainable
development for the High North.
The Council’s recent communication entitled ‘Con-
clusions on developing a European Union Policy towards
the Arctic Region, adopted two months later, follows
this line by addressing the challenge of sustainable
development in a prudent and responsible manner.89
In the context of the EU’s support for the protection
of the Arctic environment, the EU’s policies in regard
to climate change and air pollutants, including black
carbons, are especially emphasized.90
Summarizing the described development of the
EU’s objective toward promoting the use of Arctic
natural resources in a sustainable way, it can be
concluded that the EU has recognized the increasing
importance the Arctic plays in the EU, especially in
terms of its economic and geostrategic role. Accord-
ingly, it has set out a range of specific steps to take
advantage of the opportunities the Arctic offers while
safeguarding the region’s environment. However, the
agenda and priority setting in this development did not
always occur in a coordinated and systematic manner,
and the emphasis changed from a strong focus on
environmental issues to prioritizing the safeguarding
of access and supply of mineral resources. Moreover,
the latest statements underline the EU’s political
intention to reduce its reliance on external energy
resources by stressing, at the same time, its efforts
toward renewable energies and improvement of energy
efficiency.91
In contrast to the general development of the EU’s
policy objective toward Arctic mineral resources, the
following section addresses specific measures the EU
has undertaken to achieve its goal of promoting
sustainable use of Arctic resources.
5.3 The EU’s efforts to promote sustainable use of
Arctic hydrocarbons
Sustainable development is, as mentioned above, set
out in the TEU as a guiding principle as well as an
overarching goal of the EU, in particular as it applies
also to the EU’s external actions. Apart from its
climate change and environmental policies, the EU has
started to integrate the sustainable dimension in other
policy fields, as was underlined in its 2009 Review of
the EU Sustainable Strategy.92 The promotion of
83 Ibid, para 15.
84 European Parliament Motion for a Resolution, MEPs on
behalf of the Verts/ALE Group of 5 March 2014 on ‘‘The EU
strategy for the Arctic’’, available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML
+MOTION+B7-2014-0228+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
85 Ibid, para Q of the Motion for a Resolution acknowl-
edges that ‘‘there are no technologies currently available to
adequately clean up oil spills in icy conditions’’.
86 Supra, note 81, para 30.
87 Supra, note 85, paras 25 and 26. In a Press Release of 12
March 2014, Greenpeace referred to this call for a protected
area around the North Pole, although falsely cited as part of
the adopted Parliament’s resolution; available at http://
www.greenpeace.org/canada/Global/canada/pr/2014/03/
EU_Parliament_resolution_calls_for_Arctic_sanctuary_
around_North_Pole.pdf.
88 Supra, note 81, para 56.
89 Council of the European Union Conclusions of 12 Mai
2014 on ‘‘A EU Policy towards the Arctic’’, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/142554.pdf.
90 Ibid.
91 Although in practice, this political intention becomes rather
undermined by current factual developments towards closer
binding agreements between western energy corporations with
the Russian energy giant Gazprom; such as present negotia-
tions, for example, between the Austrian oil and gas company
OMVwith Gazprom towards the transfer of around a quarter
of shares in gas trading at the Central European Gas Hub
AG; or the transfer of shares in gas supply and storage from
Dutch (WINZ and Wintershall Services) and German energy
companies (Wingas und WIEH) to Gazprom, authorized by
the EU-Commission at the end of 2013. See Berliner Zeitung,
Gazprom als Gescha¨ftspartner, 26 May 2014 at 9. As regards
the Commission’s approval, See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1207_en.htm.
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sustainable use of Arctic resources is one of three main
objectives outlined by the Commission’s communica-
tion entitled The European Union and the Arctic Region
of November 2008. According to this objective, ‘‘the
exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources should
be provided in full respect of strict environmental
standards taking into account the particular vulner-
ability of the Arctic.’’93 Thus, a deeper look into EU
activities concerning mineral resource exploitation,
especially those of hydrocarbon resources, is discussed
in the following section. As mentioned, the European
energy policy is based on its Energy 2020 Strategy,
which calls for not only an effective coordination
between the EU and member states but also a
consistent and mutually reinforced external dimension
with other external activities of the EU.
Better coordination and consistency within the
external dimension of the EU energy policy also play
an important role as illustrated, for example, by the
Commission’s proposal to set up an information
exchange mechanism on intergovernmental agree-
ments between member states and third countries in
the field of energy or to establish a Strategic Group for
International Energy Cooperation, composed of
representatives of member states and relevant EU
services, to achieve a more coherent approach by the
EU and its member states.94 As far as the Arctic is
concerned, the communication explicitly refers to this
region as holding a significant potential not only to
boost the EU’s energy supply but also to contribute to
its diversification. Russia and Norway, as the EU’s
main hydrocarbon suppliers, are especially mentioned
under priority 2 – Strengthening partnerships for
secure, safe, sustainable and competitive energy – where
the existing partnerships with both countries should be
enhanced and extended.95 In October 2012, the
decision adopted by the European Parliament and
the Commission – Decision on establishing an informa-
tion exchange mechanism on intergovernmental agree-
ments between Member States and third countries in the
field of energy – ensures the objective to increase
transparency in EU internal market rules and energy
security policy goals.
Referring to the question of sustainability, flanking
environmental protection measures in connection with
resource extraction is of particular interest. Especially
when it comes to oil and gas extraction, exploration,
development, and production, activities are generally
accompanied by considerable, and often grave, direct
and indirect impacts on the environment. Regarding
oil and gas activities in the Arctic, oil spills in
particular are considered the largest threat in the
marine environment.’’96 Arctic oil spills – as occurred
in the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989 or at pipeline
leaks in the Komi Republic and the Alaskan North
Slope pipeline in 1994 and 2006 – have clearly
demonstrated the challenges in providing clean-up
measures and environmental rehabilitation, along with
those that affect local economies. The oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico in 2010, although it did not happen in
Arctic waters, raised again questions for environmen-
tal sustainability of offshore extraction in this region.
The EU, for its part, has also reacted to related
concerns: With an October 2010 communication
entitled Facing the challenge of the safety of offshore
oil and gas activities, the Commission envisaged a new
legal framework for offshore exploration and produc-
tion activities in Europe that would aim at new, EU-
wide standards, including criteria for granting drilling
permits, controls of the rigs, and safety control
mechanisms.97 Although applying to European mem-
ber states only, the Arctic is also mentioned in this
communication ‘‘due to its particularly sensitive
natural environment, harsh climate and significant
unexplored hydrocarbon reserves.’’ In this direction,
the communication pledges for the introduction of
binding international rules or benchmarks, building
inter alia on the guidelines of the Arctic Council
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines of 2009. Further-
more, contacts with Arctic states are essential.
One year later, after further assessment of the
member states’ offshore regulatory systems and
consultations with relevant stakeholders, the Commis-
sion submitted a ‘‘Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on safety of
offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and
production activities’’ in October 2011.98 This proposal
goes further than the existing regime insofar as it
proposes to extend EU environmental liability legisla-
tion to cover damage to all EU offshore waters and to
impose general safety-related obligations that are
potentially more stringent than those previously
imposed, thus resulting in changes in the licensing
process. The Arctic region, again, is especially referred
to in this proposal, as serious environmental concerns
relating to its waters require special attention to ensure
the environmental protection of the Arctic in relation
to any offshore activities, including exploration.
However, opinions on offshore drilling are divided
within the EU. Previous voices still renewed calls for a
moratorium on new offshore oil drilling off EU
shores. In July 2011, Diana Wallis, vice president of
the European Parliament with special responsibility
93 Supra, note 72.
94 See therefore especially European Commission Commu-
nication at supra, note 34.
95 Ibid.
96 Supra, note 44 at vi.
97 European Commission Communication COM (2010) 560
final of 12 October 2010 on ‘‘Facing the challenge of the
safety of offshore oil and gas activities’’.
98 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation COM
(2011) 688 final of 27 October 2011 on ‘‘A Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on safety of
offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and produc-
tion activities’’.
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for the Arctic and the High North, urged, together
with her colleague Fiona Hall from the Liberal
Democrat European Parliamentary Party (LDEPP),
a special regime for any offshore oil and gas
operations in the Arctic.99 In September 2012, the
Parliament’s Environmental Committee voted in its
Opinion on the Commission’s proposal ‘‘that Member
States should refrain from authorizing offshore
activities as long as effective response to any accident
cannot be guaranteed.’’100 However, there is a strong
lobby that opposes more stringent and EU-wide
applicable safety regulations, especially promoted by
the UK and Scottish governments as well as by their
oil and gas industries. The European Parliament’s
Industry Committee, in a key vote in October 2012,
rejected any attempts to introduce a moratorium on
oil and gas drilling in the Arctic.101 The committee also
approved a ‘‘directive’’ instead of a legally binding
‘‘regulation,’’ with the consequence that member states
would have room for implementation and thus for
continuing to maintain different standards for operat-
ing oil and gas activities in the EU. After following
negotiations with the Council, both the European
Parliament and the Council achieved an agreement on
February 21, 2013, which resumes the status of
October 2012, including the legal instrument of a
‘‘directive.’’102 Thus, offshore drilling will remain a
national competence in future, but member states
must demand specific information from companies
planning to drill in European waters. From an
environmental point of view, criticism has been raised
about the weakened stringency of required safety rules
as well as the non-entitlement of the European
Maritime and Safety Agency (EMSA) with overall
supervisory power.
The directive was finally adopted in June 2013.103
According to the previously achieved agreement
between both European institutions, the European
Parliament and the Council, the directive kept the
competence for issuing licences for offshore drilling
activities within member states’ authorities and
emphasized their independence and objectivity.104
Progressively, the directive contains comprehensive
obligations for preparing and carrying out offshore oil
and gas operations, including, among others, an
accident prevention policy, a safety and environmental
management system, a report on major hazards, and
an internal emergency response plan.105 The directive
recognizes that ‘‘the serious environmental concerns
relating to the Arctic waters require special attention
to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic in
relation to any offshore oil and gas operation,
including exploration, taking into account the risk of
major accidents and the need for effective response.’’106
In the same context, member states, who are members
of the Arctic Council, are encouraged to actively
promote the highest standards with regard to environ-
mental safety in this vulnerable and unique ecosystem.107
However, with respect to legally binding obligations
toward offshore drilling, the directive remains weak by
merely stating that the ‘‘Commission shall promote high
safety standards for offshore oil and gas operations at
international level [sic] in relevant global and regional
fora, including those relating to Arctic waters.’’108
Summarizing the EU measures for Arctic oil and
gas resources, it can be stated that the region is
especially recognized for boosting the EU’s energy
supply and contributing to its diversification. This, in
particular, applies to Russia and Norway as the major
suppliers for oil and gas to the EU-28 market. In this
context, last political statements indicate, however, a
clear tendency to reduce the EU’s reliance on external
energy resources, and instead, to increase its efforts
towards renewable energies and improvement of
energy efficiency. Moreover, it can be observed that
the EU is also aware of the particular sensitivity and
vulnerability of the Arctic environment, especially in
connection with the exploration of oil and gas. With
the directive of June 2013 on the safety of offshore oil
and gas activities, the EU has introduced a new
preparation and reporting system for operators in this
field, which also includes the preparation of emergency
response plans. And although the new rules will only
cover European territories (because the EU has no
coastline to the Arctic marine area and thus no
jurisdiction over it), they encourage European opera-
tors to apply the same policies for preventing major
accidents overseas.
99 Diana Wallis, ‘‘Diana calls for a special regime in the
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nion 2011/0309 (COD) of 24 September 2012 on ‘‘The
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and
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VI.Conclusion
The EU, on its way to developing an Arctic policy,
still has to clear several hurdles to achieve its objective
– the promotion of sustainable use of Arctic energy
resources. In doing so, it has to ensure that the
exploration and exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbons
will be conducted with full respect to strict environ-
mental standards, taking into account the particular
vulnerability of this region. While the EU undertook
significant steps toward ‘‘greening’’ its overall energy
policy, the Arctic, as mostly related to the EU’s
external dimensions of this policy, is rarely affected by
respective measures. The majority of the present
policy measures in the field of resource development,
documented in this paper, do not deal with the Arctic
as a whole. Instead, they focus on specific sub-regions
or countries of the Arctic, depending on their strategic
importance for hydrocarbons. Moreover, the parti-
cular vulnerability of the Arctic environment,
although often mentioned in this context, rarely
results in specific measures that would address related
risks accordingly. One exception is the EU’s June
2013 directive on safety of offshore oil and gas
operations. This directive, despite its shortcomings,
introduces comprehensive obligations for preparing
and carrying out offshore oil and gas operations,
including, among others, new reporting obligations
on major hazards as well as obligations on the
provision of emergency response plans for operators
active in this field. By encouraging European opera-
tors to apply the same policies for preventing major
accidents overseas as they apply in their EU opera-
tions, the Arctic might also profit from these rules.
Another emphasis of the EU’s overall energy policy –
the reduction of its dependency on external energy
imports to be replaced by promoting energy efficiency
with increased production of renewable energy – can
be also observed as an aspect of its resource policy
toward Arctic energy resources. However, current
developments tend to increase European dependency
on the Arctic energy supply. This tendency applies in
particular to gas imports from Russia to the
European market, which will increase in the forth-
coming years. Last but not least, deficiencies of
necessary coordination among European institutions
as well as within overarching policies often pose
additional challenges. Therefore, better coordination
should be one priority to enhance the EU’s coherence
on its path to promote sustainable use of Arctic
resources. And finally, as far as an EU policy on
‘‘Arctic’’ resources primarily impacts its external
capacity, ‘‘speaking with one voice’’ is, also in this
context, a precondition to moving forward.
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